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Introduction
Hughes et al.1 recently discussed arguments for and
against giving special funding status to orphan drugs
in this journal. They concluded that there should be
a uniform policy across Europe, that complete
restriction was impractical, and that UK policy
should aspire to the values of the EU directive.
The aims of this paper are to correct some
inaccuracies in the original paper, develop some
of the key issues, and to draw some conclusions
regarding the question ‘Do drugs for exceptionally
rare disease deserve special status for funding?’ For
ease, our paper adopts the same structure as the
original.
Special status considerations
Hughes et al. state that a key issue is ‘whether the
rarity and gravity of the condition represents a
rational basis for applying a different value to health
gain . . .’1
The defining characteristic of an orphan drug is
that it treats a rare disease. However, the justifica-
tion for special funding frequently rests upon the
‘gravity’ of the condition. To examine whether
orphan drug legislation accurately represents soci-
etal preferences, it would be necessary to ask
whether society was willing to pay more for
treatments for rare severe disorders than for more
prevalent severe disorders. No study has done this.
Hughes et al. recount another frequently cited
argument for special treatment: ‘ensuring access to
treatment where no other treatment exists.’ Like
‘gravity’, this is not a defining characteristic of an
orphan drug, but it is a frequently cited argument for
their special status in licensing and reimbursement.1
Not being unique to orphan drugs, it cannot be a
justification for their special status.
Further, this argument contains an implicit pre-
ference for biological disease modification over
health gain. In the developed world, ‘no other
treatment’ is a substantial misrepresentation of
reality; patients are not simply left with no medical
treatment at all. The dichotomy is between best
supportive care and disease modifying care. Best
supportive care could have a greater impact upon
health-related quality of life than a pharmaceutical
agent. For example, £7500 per patient per year
spent on home-help services could have a greater
impact on the health-related quality of life of
someone with multiple sclerosis than spending the
same money on a disease-modifying therapy such
beta interferon. If the objective of the health care
system is to improve health, then health gain from
best supportive care should not be valued less than
health gain from disease-modifying therapy.
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It is legitimate to specify different or additional
objectives. Indeed, the Department of Health
requires the NHS to promote population health
and innovation. Palmer and Smith2 argue that new
therapies have an option value, which should be
taken into account in reimbursement decisions.
Disease-modifying therapies, unlike best supportive
care, offer the option of future knowledge, which
may in turn, lead to a cure. Decisions not to
reimburse new therapies reduce the incentives to
pursue future knowledge, and thus the hope of a
cure. Again, this argument is not unique to orphan
drugs; there are many prevalent diseases for which
there is no cure. The decision not to reimburse
the latest therapy always has implications for the
development of future knowledge.
Methodological issues concerning
evidence on effectiveness
Hughes et al. repeat the generally accepted argu-
ment that it is often not possible to recruit an
adequate sample size (to an RCT) to test treatments
for very rare diseases.1 Certainly, treatments for
extremely rare diseases are often licensed on the
basis of extremely small clinical studies. However,
it is far from clear that more robust evidence could
not be provided.
For example, ceredase, a treatment for Gaucher’s
disease, was initially licensed on the basis of a study
that recruited 12 people. Within 10 years the
Gaucher’s Registry had approximately 3000 patients
on therapy, casting doubt over the assumed
difficulty in undertaking a conventional randomized
controlled trial.3
Hughes et al. highlight the reliance on short-term
surrogate outcomes in the evidence base for orphan
drugs.1 They propose improvements in post-market-
ing studies, and the development of registries to
address the limitations of the evidence. However,
the major uncertainty in establishing the effective-
ness of orphan drugs is the natural history of the
disease.3 The opportunity to collect information
on the natural history of a disease is significantly
reduced once a disease-modifying therapy becomes
available. Post-marketing studies cannot address this
primary uncertainty in the evidence base.
Registries of all patients with the disease are
required to address this uncertainty. To ensure these
data are available, regulatory authorities need to
require that such registries are established when a
therapy is given orphan designation. This would
provide evidence on the natural history of the
disease at the time of licensing, so that authorities
could accurately assess a therapy’s effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness. Such registries would also help
identify subjects for recruitment to the clinical
trial programme, and provide the infrastructure
necessary to implement the proposed post-licensing
studies.
As an aside, disease registers can be usefully
contrasted with health technology registers. Many of
the registers in the UK can be described as
technology registers; registers of those using parti-
cular technologies, rather than all those patients
with the disease. If a disease register includes both
patients who are using and those not using the
technology, then provided other relevant factors are
included, case-control studies become possible.
Given the high cost of many orphan drugs, and
the uncertainty of their effectiveness compared to
no treatment, it seems reasonable for funding to
be conditional on entry into disease registers. The
advent of electronic patient records greatly reduces
the previously high cost of disease registers.
NICE has recommended the development of disease
registers for several new technologies.
In the absence of improvements in the quality of
the evidence provided to licensing and reimburse-
ment authorities, the weakness of the evidence does
not represent an argument for excusing treatments
for rare diseases from formal appraisal. The limited
volume of data may be an insurmountable problem
in the hypothesis-testing paradigm adopted by the
regulatory authorities. However, it is not a problem
in the decision-analytic paradigm adopted by
reimbursement authorities.4
Limited budget impact
Surprisingly, Hughes et al. consider cost, divorced
from any consideration of the opportunity cost. They
observe that a drug costing £50 000 per patient per
year, would only cost £2.5m a year if there were
only 50 patients to be treated.1 However, the cost
should not be considered without reference to the
value of what is foregone;5 £2.5m would pay for
over 520 hip replacements.6
Equity issues
Hughes et al. consider what they call ‘the equity
principle’ and ‘a rights-based approach’ to health
care provision. They rightly conclude that neither
will favour treatments for rare conditions over more
prevalent conditions. They then propose the ‘rule of
rescue’ as the basis for the special status for orphan
drugs. While acknowledging that the rule of rescue
normally applies to the prevention of imminent
death, they cite Hadorn to claim that it also applies
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when life is not endangered.7 Thus, they interpret
the rule of rescue as a commitment to the non-
abandonment of individuals when (a) there is a
small number of cases; (b) the condition is severe
(but not necessarily immediately life-threatening),
and (c) no alternative treatments are available.
If we are to accept (a) then we accept that
whereas passengers in a car that is about to explode
should be saved at all costs, passengers on a jumbo
jet about to explode need not be, as the numbers are
large! Regarding (b), severity of the condition, the
characteristic of an orphan drug is the rarity of the
condition, so it makes no sense to justify special
status in terms of severity. Finally, (c) implies that if
there is only one way to save lives, then these lives
should be saved at all costs, but if there is more than
one way to save the same lives then this no longer
applies, which is also absurd.
The paper gives an example of the ‘rule of rescue’
where children from poor countries with physical
deformities are transported for treatment in rich
countries. This phenomenon is also known as giving
priority or special treatment to the ‘identifiable
victim’. If the argument for special treatment actually
rests upon the identifiable individual condition, then
it is important to think through the implications for
the funding of other interventions, because unlike
the other characteristics, identifiability is a charac-
teristic that is amenable to individual choice and
control.
Since the introduction of explicit prioritization
across the NHS, some individuals have sought to
overturn local commissioners’ decisions using the
media; the most recent example being the provision
of herceptin to women with early breast cancer.8
Their publicity has created pressure to provide a
very expensive therapy whose effectiveness is highly
uncertain.9 To enshrine special status for identified
individuals would create an incentive for more
people to use the media to achieve ‘identified
individual’ status and thus overturn population level
prioritization decisions.
The debate around orphan drugs must recognize
that the ‘rule of rescue’ is not in fact a rule, but rather
a concept that explains the observed instinctive
emotional reactions of individuals to tragic events in
urgent circumstances. The process of putting a name
to the sentiment and showing that it is prevalent,
does not make it a valid basis for policy. For the ‘rule
of rescue’ to be a valid basis for policy, it requires a
normative justification.
Whether an affected individual is known or
unknown is merely a matter of time and perspective,
i.e. someone may be regarded as an unknown
statistical life to one observer but will be, or become
identifiable to another. From the broad societal
perspective, we know that with enough information,
or simply with time, those currently regarded as
unknown statistical lives will become known. At this
point, coherence in decision-making requires that
their health be valued in the same way as currently
‘known’ lives. Social decision-making should reflect
this broader view, and not give undue weight to
values based in private perspectives and inadequate
information. The alternative is that any intervention
will be cost-effective, as long as those who bear the
opportunity cost are unknown to us at the time we
make the decision.10
Options for policy
recommendations
Assigning equity weights
The authors propose equity weights as a means of
incorporating society’s preferences over prevalence
into cost-effectiveness analysis. However, equity
weights are a purely technical means of incorporat-
ing established social preferences into the QALY
framework. Without robust evidence that society
has a preference for rarity alone,11 equity weights
are irrelevant. What little evidence there is, does not
support the existence of such preferences. Over
80% of the NICE Citizens Council said that rarity
alone was not a reason to pay a premium price for a
drug. Over 80% also said that disease severity might
represent a basis for paying a premium. Only three
members of the council (of 27) believed that rarity
alone justified paying a premium.12
Risk sharing and ‘no cure, no pay’ schemes
Hughes et al. cite a number of conditional
reimbursement systems that have been devised.
While we broadly support such schemes, the ability
to establish that the therapy has delivered the
claimed health gain is dependent upon the quality
of the evidence on the natural history. The use
of conditional reimbursement schemes further
strengthens the argument for disease registries to
be established when an investigational drug receives
orphan designation.
Clinical and pharmacogenetic criteria
The specification of clinical criteria beyond the
limitations set out in the license may reduce the total
expenditure on a specific therapy, but will not, in
itself, address the challenge of the difference
between the cost of the therapy and the value that
society places upon the expected health gain. If the
criteria for reimbursement are clinical characteristics
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that are predictive of greater health gain from
therapy, then there is the potential for more cost-
effective use of orphan drugs. However, the knowl-
edge of the natural history of these extremely rare
conditions is such that it is often not possible to
specify a priori criteria that are reliably predictive of
enhanced or reduced health gain.3
The authors describe a procedure developed in
Ontario, Canada, whereby a committee of medical
experts decides who should receive enzyme
replacement treatment for Gaucher’s disease. The
effectiveness of the process cannot be established,
as the knowledge of the natural history of Gaucher’s
disease is vanishingly small, and what data there
are, are inconsistent. Even though it is a mono-
genetic disorder, there are over 200 allele muta-
tions, of which very few are associated with milder
or more severe forms of the disease.3 It is difficult to
see how the medical experts can be confident about
the health gain from therapy, as they cannot say
with confidence what would happen in the absence
of treatment.
Funding by research councils
There may be merit in the research councils funding
research into treatments for rare diseases; the
condition being that the expected return on the
research investment should exceed the cost of
undertaking the research. Normally, when this
condition is met, we would expect the private
sector to be willing to invest in such research. This
said, there are reasons why the private sector may
not value future benefits correctly.10 In these
circumstances, funding from the research councils
may be appropriate. However, market failure of this
sort is not specific to rarity, and it is thus unclear
why rare diseases should have privileged access to
limited research council resources.
Dedicated funding
Dedicated funding is an increasingly common
financing structure, especially within the UK NHS.
However, the question that faces decision makers
is how much funding should dedicated to the care
of a particular disease group. If the answer to this
question is divorced from the value of the health
gain produced, it is difficult to see how a specific
allocation of resources, dedicated or otherwise, can
be justified. Dedicated resources provide transpar-
ency about the implied value of health gain to the
members of the population. However, it avoids the
key policy question: whether funding should be
dedicated to the treatment of rare diseases, or to
others. Dedicated funding does not resolve the
opportunity cost issue.
Conclusions
Having reviewed their paper in some detail, we are
unconvinced that Hughes et al. have furnished any
sustainable arguments for giving special status to
treatments for rare diseases. Perhaps because of this,
their conclusion actually contains a new argument
for special status: the ‘unacceptability of postcode
prescribing from an equity stance’.1
It is timely to note that postcode prescribing is the
unavoidable result of devolving reimbursement
decisions to local commissioners. Different localities
have different health needs, priorities and budgets,
and thus make different commissioning decisions.
Postcode prescribing may be a sign of effective local
commissioning. What is required for this variation
to be acceptable is a legitimate process such as
that described by Burls et al.13 Arbitrary national
interventions to address legitimate variation can
damage the development of local health services
and the efficient use of limited resources.13 Whether
the decision is made at a local or national level, the
application of consistent, sustainable principles does
not lead to a special status for treatments for rare
diseases. Arguing for national policies is irrelevant to
making the case for special status for treatments for
rare diseases.
Hughes et al. end their paper with the following
statement: ‘It is clear that a complete restriction on
the funding of ultra-orphan drugs is not a practical or
realistic solution’.1 If the examination of the
justifications for orphan status, and conclusions
about how in principle they should be evaluated,
is to be restricted to those answers which interested
parties currently find to be ‘practical and reason-
able’, then there seems little purpose in the
preceding discussion.
At no point in their paper have they made a
convincing argument as to why this should be the
case. What little evidence there is, suggests that
society does not view rarity alone as a strong reason
to pay premium prices.12 Against this background, if
the value of the expected health gain from the use of
orphan drugs is less than the cost of those drugs, it is
legitimate and appropriate to completely restrict
their funding.
Interestingly, little mention is made by Hughes
et al., or others involved in this debate, of the prices
of orphan drugs. These prices are often extraordi-
narily high: in many cases, orders of magnitude
higher than those of any other health technology.
Imatinib is priced at around £20k, and ERT at
around £80k per patient per annum. Some of these
prices, notably those of imatinib, have nothing to do
with the costs of developing the compound.14
Similarly, with ceredase, the first ERT, there were
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plausible reasons for the extremely high initial cost,
but its chemical synthesis should have reduced the
cost substantially.15
Pricing pharmaceuticals has little to do with the
market.16 The state, through patent legislation,
provides incentives for pharmaceutical research.
The rules of patent protection, which are blunt and
based on history rather than logic, have in many
countries been altered to provide further incentives
for research on rare diseases.17,18 Contrary to
expectations, some of the resulting orphan drugs
have been highly profitable, due largely to their
unprecedented high prices.
Given that the case for orphan drug legislation
had to with countering low profitability, an argu-
ment can be made for monitoring the effect the
legislation has had, not only on the development of
new drugs, but also their prices. Orphan drug
legislation has been one of the major changes in
the patent regulation of pharmaceuticals, but one
which has led to unexpected results, notably high
prices. At this time, rather than considering the
extension of the privileged regulatory provision of
treatments for rare diseases to the reimbursement
arena, there is a need to review the rationale for, and
operation of, the existing legislation.
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